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The Impact of Geduldig v. Aiello on the EEOC
Guidelines on Sex Discrimination
The status of women's rights under the fourteenth amendment
has remained generally unclear due to the Supreme Court's unwilling-
ness to designate the constitutional implications of classifications which
differentiate according to sex-based criteria. This confusion is com-
pounded in the area of labor market discrimination, particularly when
pregnancy issues are involved, by the strong policies suggested by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex' promulgated under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.2
The Supreme Court's decision in Geduldig v. Aiello,' which re-
fused to invalidate under the fourteenth amendment a state income
maintenance program that excluded pregnancy from its coverage, shed
uncertainty on the continuing viability of the Guidelines' provisions
on pregnancy, which demand that pregnancy disabilities be treated the
same as any other physical disabilities. This note will examine the
criteria applicable to sex discrimination under the fourteenth amend-
ment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and explore the significant
differences existing between these two sources of law. It is argued that
although the fourteenth amendment may not currently require standards
such as those found in the Guidelines, neither does it prohibit them.
TITLE VII PREGNANCY POLICIES UNDER THE GUIDELINES
Title VIIP of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 proscribes, in general,
discrimination in the job market based on race, religion, color, national
origin, and sex. The Guidelines expressly state that an employer may
not refuse to hire a woman or terminate her employment because the
'29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1974).
242 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970). The Act grants the Commission rulemaking authority
in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1970) :
The Commission shall have authority from time to time to issue, amend, or
rescind suitable procedural regulations to carry out the provisions of this sub-
chapter. Regulations issued under this section shall be in conformity with the
standards and limitations of the Administrative Procedure Act.
-417 U.S. 484 (1974).
4 For a comprehensive analysis of Title VII, its legislative history, procedure, and
remedies see Note, Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of x964, 84 HtAv. L. REv. 1109 (1971).
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woman is pregnant.' While an employer is not required to provide
health insurance, disability insurance, sick leave or job guarantees, if
any such plan is offered, it must treat pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion,
childbirth, and recovery therefrom the same as any other temporary
disabilities.' Moreover, the Guidelines state that if termination of an em-
ployee occurs under an employment policy allowing insufficient leave
or no leave, it violates the Act if it has a disparate impact on employees
of one sex and is not justified by business necessity."
TITLE VII vs. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
An aggrieved party contemplating a suit over sexually discrimin-
atory employment practices must be concerned with substantive law
under the fourteenth amendment and Title VII. Where the necessary
degree of state action is present, a plaintiff may have a choice between
equal protection and Title VII theories of recovery. Of course, both
may be simultaneously available. Where the dispute is wholly between
an individual and a private employer, however, only Title VII will be
available. Nonetheless, the fourteenth amendment remains crucial in
determining the permissible reach of Title VII, particularly in the areas
of affirmative action and reverse discrimination.
Scope of Application
The narrowness of Title VII contrasts with the breadth of the
equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
Title VII specifically proscribes discrimination based on race, religion,
5 (a) A written or unwritten employment policy or practice which excludes from
employment applicants or employees because of pregnancy is in prima facie viola-
tion of title VII.
(b) Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abor-
tion, childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, tempo-
rary disabilities and should be treated as such under any health or temporary
disability insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with employment.
Written and unwritten employment policies and practices in volving matters such
as the commencement and duration of leave, the availability of extensions, the
accrual of seniority and other benefits and privileges, reinstatement, and pay-
ment under any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan, for-
mal or informal, shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy or childbirth on
the same terms and conditions as they are applied to other temporary disabilities.
(c) Where the termination of an employee who is temporarily disabled is
caused by an employment policy under which insufficient or no leave is available,
such a termination violates the Act if it has a disparate impact on employees of
one sex and is not justified by business necessity.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1974).
Old. § 1604.10(b).
I Id. § 1604.10 (c).
19751
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
color, national origin, and sex only in the employment situation. The
fourteenth amendment is not restricted to prohibiting discrimination
based on these characteristics, nor is its application limited to the labor
market.' The equal protection clause imposes a duty upon the states
to treat all persons similarly situated in a fair and equivalent manner.
It has been construed as requiring not only fair or equal enforcement
of laws, but also that the law itself be equal.'
Initially, the equal protection clause was applied only to racial dis-
crimination exclusively directed against blacks, 0 then to other racial
groups and to economic affairs.1' More recently, the equal protection
clause has transcended race relations to include such areas as legislative
reapportionment,' 2 voting, 8 criminal process, 4 and school financing."
Standards of Review
A variety of standards of review are available under the four-
teenth amendment. The choice of standard may have the effect, among
others, of shifting the burden of persuasion from the petitioner to the
state. The "rational basis" test was created to determine whether
there was a rational reason for treating people differently. Under this
relatively narrow standard of review the statute or regulation is pre-
sumed valid, leaving it to the plaintiff to demonstrate its invalidity.
A stricter standard of review was established when the Supreme
Court became discontented with the results of traditional equal pro-
tection analysis ir some areas. The Court developed the "compelling
state interest" test to be employed where discrimination is based upon
8 For comprehensive analyses of the fourteenth amendment principles related to equal
protection as a technique of judicial review see Bartlett, Pregnancy and the Constitution:
The Uniqueness Trap, 62 CALiF. L. Ray. 1532, 1537-47 (1974); Gunther, Foreword: In
Search of an Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Pro-
tection, 86 Hagv. L. Rav. 1 (1972); Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 CALu'. L. REv. 341 (1949) ; Note, supra note 4.
9 The Court has frequently cited with approval Justice Matthews' statement that "the
equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
10 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873).
" Note, Developments in the Law--Equal Protection, 82 HAgv. L. Ray. 1065, 1069
(1969).1 2 E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
'is E.g., Harper v. -Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
24 E.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) ; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956).
15 E.g., San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
16 See notes 22, 25 infra & text accompanying; see also Lamber, A Married Woman's
Surname: Is Custom Law?, 4 WASH. U.L.Q. 779, 803 n.100 (1973).
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a "suspect" classification'7 or impinges on a "fundamental right."1 8
Under this standard demanding strict judicial scrutiny, a court appears
to presume that the regulation or law is invalid, and the state has the
burden of establishing its validity," much as an employer must do under
Title VII.
In Reed v. Reed2" the Court established yet a third standard of
review, stricter than the rational basis standard but less strict than the
standard of strict scrutiny. The Reed test refines the meaning of "ra-
tional," requiring that a classification be "reasonable, not arbitrary,""
and that it rest upon some distinction having a "fair and substantial"
relationship to the object of legislation.22 The existence of these differ-
ing standards of review is the court's way of stipulating how much
discretion the policymaker may use in making classifications. The more
discretion permissible, the lower the standard of review used.
In contrast, there is but a single standard employed under Title
VII. That standard permits only two justifications for sex discrimina-
tion. One is the statutorily created test of bona fide occupational quali-
fication (BFOQ)."2 The second is the judicially created defense of
17 E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage) ; Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) ; Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (race); Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (national origin).
18 E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (voting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(travel) ; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1970) (privacy).
If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of thu individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to 1ear or beget a child.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, supra, at 453.
19 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) ; Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 9 (1967); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956).
20404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding unconstitutional Idaho's mandatory preference for
men in estate administration positions).
21 Id. at 76.
22 Id.
23 Sex as a bona fide occupational qualification.
(a) The Commission believes that the bona fide occupational qualification
exception as to sex should be interpreted narrowly. Labels--"iMen's jobs" and
"Women's jobs"-tend to deny employment opportunities unnecessarily to one
sex or the other.
(1) The Commission will find that the following situations do not war-
rant the application of the bona fide occupational quaiification exception:
(i) The refusal to hire a woman because of her sex based on as-
sumptions of the comparative employment characteristics of women in
general. For example, the assumption that the turn-over rate among
women is higher than among men.
(ii) The refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped charac-
terizations of the sexes. Such stereotypes include, for example, that men
are less capable of assembling intricate equipment; that women are less
capable of aggressive salesmanship. The principle of non-discrimina-
1975]
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"business necessity," under which the employer must satisfy each of
three standards:
[T]he business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to override
any racial impact; the challenged practice must effectively carry
out the business purpose it is alleged to serve; and there must be
available no acceptable alternative policies or practices which would
better accomplish the business purpose advanced, or accomplish
it equally well with a lesser differential racial impact.24
Further, under Title VII, the presumption runs against the validity
of the challenged practice or policy, leaving the employer with the heavy
burden of proof-the opposite of all but the strictest fourteenth amend-
ment standards.25
tion requires that individuals be considered on the basis of individual
capacities and ndt on the basis of any characteristics generally attributed
to the group.
(iii) The refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences
of coworkers, the employer, clients or customers except as covered spe-
cifically in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph.
(2) Where it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuine-
ness, the Commission will consider sex to be a bona fide occupational quali-
fication; e.g., an actor or actress.
(b) Effect of sex-oriented state employment legislation.
(1) Many States have enacted laws or promulgated administrative regu-
lations with respect to the employment of females. Among these laws are
those which prohibit or limit the employment of females, e.g., the employ-
ment of females in certain occupations, in jobs requiring the lifting or
carrying of weights exceeding certain prescribed limits, during certain hours
of the night, for more than a specified number of hours per day or per week,
and for certain periods of time before and after childbirth. The Commission
has found that such laws and regulations do not take into account the ca-
pacities, preferences, and abilities of individual females and, therefore, dis-
criminate on the basis of sex. The Commission has concluded that such laws
and regulations conflict with and are superseded by Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Accordingly, such laws will not be considered a de-
fense to an otherwise established unlawful employment practice or as a
basis for the application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1974). See also Bartlett, supra note 11, at 1545 n.77, 1546 for the
view that a person has less protection with the irrebuttable presumption approach than
under the equal protection strict scrutiny test and for a comparison of the BFOQ excep-
tion and irrebuttable presumptions.
24 Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971) (footnotes omitted).
25 A significant aspect of the fourteenth amendment analysis is that courts "presume"
that the state policy is valid unless shown to the contrary. The heavy burden of estab-
lishing that a regulation is arbitrary is on the petitioner. For example, in Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1971), the Court held that in the realm of social welfare
programs, it is reasonable for a legislature to select one phase of a problem and attempt
to remedy it in any one of several constitutionally valid ways. In contrast, Title VII
grants no such "presumption" of validity in favor of the policymaker. Once the peti-
tioner has alleged she has been treated differentially the burden of justifying the treat-
ment is on the employer. The petitioner is not required, under Title VII, to show the
differential treatment is not reasonable or necessary to a compelling interest, as she would
be under the equal protection clause. For example, in Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
[Vol. 50:592
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Thus, Title VII standards are more stringent and permit the policy-
maker less discretion than does the fourteenth amendment. While a
fixed policy of classification regarding conditions of employment may
survive an equal protection challenge, it may still violate Title VII.
2 6
For example, the finding in Aiello that a state-administered, employee-
funded health insurance program that excluded pregnancy did not
violate the fourteenth amendment might not be controlling under Title
VII.2 1
Available Defenses
Still other differences in fourteenth amendment and Title VII an-
alyses arise in terms of available defenses. In Hutchison v. Lake
Oswego School District," the district court stated that the following
defenses, which defendant had attempted to assert against both the
Title VII and equal protection claims, might be valid under the equal
protection lause, but not in a Title VII action:
"(1) plaintiff must show dissimilar treatment of persons similarly
situated, (2) pregnancy is sui generis, (3) pregnancy is voluntary,
(4) the maternity sick-leave policy does not apply to women in an
area in which they compete with men, and (5) benefits could not
372 F. Supp. 1146 (W.D. Pa. 1974), the district court held that the income protection
plan which provided income for long-term illnesses discriminated against female em-
ployees by excluding pregnancy, while including illnesses whose incidence among males
is predominant, did not comply with Title VII Guidelines. Id. at 1158. The court indi-
cated that the employer had not met its burden of proving validity since it failed to
show that cost, its business purpose, was sufficiently compelling, that it was precisely
serving that objective, and that it was the best alternative available. Similarly, the Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in Gilbert v. General Electric Co., 375
F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974), recently declined to presume that the policy of excluding
pregnancy-related benefits from its sickness and accident plan was valid under Title VII
analysis. In fact, the court in Gilbert held that to isolate pregnmy disabilities for less
favorable treatment in General Electric's sickness and accident plan, purportedly designed
to relieve the economic burden of physical incapacity, was discrimination based on sex.
Id. at 382.
26See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146, 1159 (W.D. Pa.
1974), citing Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972),
cert. dentied, 409 U.S. 1107 (1973), and Newmon v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d 768
(5th Cir. 1973).2 Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975) held that an employer-
offered income protection plan which excluded pregnancy benefits from coverage while
including other kinds of temporary disabilities and a maternity kave policy which treats
pregnancy differently from other temporary disabilities violates Title VII. The Third
Circuit rejected Liberty Mutual's argument that after Aiello, Title VII does not require
the employer to include pregnancy benefits in its income protection plan, distinguishing
the Wetzel situation as requiring statutory interpretation rather than a constitutional
analysis. The court indicated the reliance on Aiello was improper Liot only on that distinc-
tion, but also because in Aiello it had been necessary to balance social welfare interests
with the Constitution. Id. at 203.
28 374 F. Supp. 1056 (D. Ore. 1974).
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be fairly awarded because of the varying lengths of incapacity
among women due to childbirth.29
Further, Hutchison held that the administrative burden and the cost of
providing sick-leave benefits for pregnancy-related disabilities offer no
defense to a Title VII action," whereas these may be defenses in equal
protection cases not employing the strict scrutiny standard of review.
Requirement of Motive
It is arguable that the main thrust of the constitutional proscrip-
tion. of employment discrimination is toward deliberate acts of dis-
crimination.3 ' Title VII Guidelines go beyond such a proscription to
stipulate that a policy neutral on its face is discriminatory if it has a
disparate effect on a protected class. Indeed, the first time the Supreme
Court had occasion to construe the scope of Title VII, it held that
"Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of em-
ployment practices, not simply the motivation."8 The most that can
be said for the equal protection analysis is that it is not clear if it would
proscribe a policy neutral on its face but with a differential impact.
There can be no question that such a policy is prohibited by Title VII
since the Guidelines were so interpreted in Sprogis v. United Air Lines,
Inc.3
8
PREGNANCY AND EMPLOYMENT UNDER THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:
THE EFFECT OF AIELLO ON TITLE VII
In Geduldig v. Aiello the Supreme Court first considered the re-
lation of the equal protection clause to the treatment of pregnancy.8'
29 Id. at 1061.
sold. at 1063.
$1 Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE
L.J. 1205 (1970).
32 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
83444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971) (no-marriage rule for
airline stewardesses violates Title VII).
84 In the past, many lower federal courts have considered the issue. Compare Green
v. Waterford Ed. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973) and Bucldey v. Coyle Pub. School
Sys., 476 F.2d 92 (10th Cir. 1973) (invalidating sixth and fourth month mandatory
maternity leave rules for teachers), with Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 459
F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1107 (1973) (upholding a compulsory
leave policy after seven months of pregnancy). See also Seamon v. Spring Lake Park
Ind. School Dist., 363 F. Supp. 944 (D. Minn. 1973) ; Heath v. Westerville Bd. of Educ.,
345 F. Supp. 501 (S.D. Ohio 1972) ; Williams v. San Francisco Unified School Dist, 340
F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Monell v. Department of Soc. Serv., 357 F. Supp. 1051
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Bravo v. Board of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Robin-
son v. Rand, 340 F. Supp. 37 (D. Colo. 1972).
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The challenge alleged that the exclusion of normal childbirth from
coverage under a state-administered, employee-funded disability insur-
ance program"5 violated the equal protection clause. 8 Justice Stewart,
writing for the majority, viewed this case as a Dandridgesr situation
and stated that as long as the legislature establishes a rationally support-
able classification, courts cannot force it, under the authority of the equal
protection clause, to address all aspects of a problem rather than select-
ing certain areas or neglecting the problem altogether." The Court held
that the state's reasons for not granting benefits to women for normal
pregnancy39 provided a reasonable and wholly noninvidious basis for
not providing a more comprehensive insurance program."0
There are three possible effects Aiello might have on the EEOC
Guidelines.
85 CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2601 (West 1972) provides:
The purpose of this part is to compensate in part for the wage loss sustained
by individuals unemployed because of sickness or injury and to reduce to a mini-
mum the suffering caused by unemployment resulting therefrom. This part shall
be construed liberally in aid of its declared purpose to mitigate the evils and
burdens which fall on the unemployed and disabled worker and his family.
CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE: § 2626.2 (West Supp. 1975) (disabilities arising from preg-
nancy) provides:
Benefits relating to pregnancy shall be paid under this part only in accord-
ance with the following:
(a) Disability benefits shall be paid upon a doctor's certification that the
claimant is disabled because of an abnormal and involuntary complication of
pregnancy, including but not limited to: puerperal infection, eclampsia, caesarean
section delivery, ectopic pregnancy, and toxemia.
(b) Disability benefits shall be paid upon a doctor's certification that a con-
dition possibly arising out of pregnancy would disable the claimant without re-
gard to the pregnancy, including but not limited to: anemia, diabetes, embolism,
heart disease, hypertension, phlebitis, phlebothrombosis, pyelonephritis, thrombo-
phlebitis, vaginitis, varicose veins, and venous thrombosis.
386 417 U.S. at 486.87See note 25 supra.
38 417 U.S. at 495.
9 The state argued that the reasons for not granting benefits to women for normal
pregnancy were to distribute the available resources in such a w-.y as to keep benefits at
an adequate level for those disabilities that were covered, to maintain the self-supporting
nature of the program, and to hold the contributions at a level that would not unduly
burden participating employees who might be most in need of the disability insurance.
Id. at 495-97.
40 Id. at 496. The holding seems to be based on the lack of. certain evidence. The
appellee failed to meet her burden of proof that the choice of risks in the program dis-
criminated against a definable class with respect to the total risk protection received by
that class from the program. Neither did she show that "distinctions involving pregnancy
were mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of
one sex or the other . . . ." Id. at 496-97 n.20. Consequently, the Court said, legisla-
tors, on any reasonable basis, were free to offer or not offer coverage in this kind of legis-
lation. As an evidentiary matter, the "rational basis" standard of review and its pre-
sumption of validity make such proof almost impossible. See text accompanying note
16 supra.
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Guidelines Are Constitutional
Initially, it could be argued that Aiello will have no effect on the
validity of the Guidelines. While Aiello holds that normal childbirth
benefits may constitutionally be withheld, it does not say they must be.
The Guidelines, by requiring that any employer-offered plan must treat
pregnancy as any other temporary disability,4 merely go further than
required by equal protection. It should always be permissible to pro-
vide for more than the constitutional minimum amount of protection."2
Thus Title VII, and the Guidelines, are still valid and reflect different
congressional powers and policies.
Guidelines Exceed EEOC Authority
If Aiello is interpreted broadly to stand for the proposition that
classifications based on pregnancy do not constitute sex-based discrim-
ination," it could be argued that the Guidelines exceed the authority
granted the EEOC pursuant to Title VII. Under this interpretation,
the EEOC is authorized to act in the employment area only where there
is some sex-based discrimination. Because pregnancy classifications do
not discriminate on the basis of sex, the EEOC is powerless to act. Thus
the Guidelines, as they relate to pregnancy, are void.44
It is not clear from Aiello when pregnancy is a sex-based classifica-
tion and when it is not. One possible distinction may be the area in
which the different treatment is accorded. That is, differentiation in
eligibility for state-administered disability benefits is not sex-based, but
differing policies affecting leave or other conditions of employment,
such as hiring, firing, or seniority, might well be.45 The Guidelines can
4129 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1974).42 But see text accompanying notes 62-63 infra, where the opposing argument is
presented.
4 One commentator has interpreted the Guidelines as intending without requiring
that pregnancy classifications should be treated as sex-based discrimination under Title
VII. See Bartlett, supra note 8, at 1564. But see Communication Workers of America
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., Long Lines Dep't, 379 F. Supp. 679, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
The court indicates that Aiello is not "a retreat from the Court's modem view as to dis-
crimination on grounds of sex (or gender), but-as footnote 20 plainly indicates-a find-
ing that disparity of treatment based on pregnancy does not in and of itself constitute
such discrimination." This determination precludes relief under Title VII, which deals
only with sex discrimination.
44 In Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), the court did not
find any congressional intent contrary to the Guidelines. The court distinguished Espi-
noza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973), which held that the guidelines on national
origin, although entitled to deference, were inconsistent with congressional intent that
citizenship not be a requirement for federal or private employment. Nor did the Wetzel
court find any compelling indications that the Guidelines are wrong.
45 See Memorandum from Women's Rights Project, American Civil Liberties Union,
New York, to Affiliates, Nov. 21, 1974. The argument is made that state laws presuming
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be saved by limiting the Aiello holding to its facts: normal pregnancies
may be treated differently from other disabilities under a state-admin-
istered program which is only tangentially related to employment. This
would be in accord with Justice Stewart's treatment of Aiello as a social
welfare case, in which the state's policies limiting coverage were pre-
sumed valid." Different facts, involving a private insurance plan
directly tied to the employment relationship, should be viewed as pre-
senting a wholly different case, thereby leaving the EEOC free to
regulate such programs.
Even if Aiello is interpreted broadly, it can be argued that the
Court erred in not finding that the exclusion of normal pregnancy from
the program was a sex-based classification." Justice Stewart avoided
this finding by determining that the classification was pregnant persons
as opposed to nonpregnant persons. The status of being pregnant,
rather than the status of being a woman, was held to be the deter-
minative classification. However, since surely orly women become
pregnant, the Court determined in effect that the classification was based
on sex plus the additional factor of pregnancy. Interpreting the Court's
analysis in this way makes it, as least arguably, inconsistent with the
holding of Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp."8 There, the Court struck
that a pregnant woman is not available for employment and therefore is ineligible to re-
ceive unemployment insurance solely because she is pregnant may be found to violate the
due process clause. See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFletr, 414 U.S. 632 (1974)
(mandatory maternity leave policies at the fourth or fifth month violate the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment).
46 In line with this argument, the decision does not seem to turn on whether the ex-
clusion of pregnancy from the state program was a form of sex discrimination or not.
In either case, the Court concluded that under the rational basis tests, the policy of ex-
cluding pregnancy is rationally related to the legitimate state puroses.
47 The Court specifically, but enigmatically, rejected the rlaintiff's argument that
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was discrimination on the basis of sex. One
can only wonder at such conclusory footnote statements as "[wihile it is true that only
women become pregnant, it does not follow that every legislatix e classification concern-
ing pregnancy is a sex-based classification like those contained in Reed . . . and
Frontiero . . . ." 417 U.S. at 496 n.20.
For the view that as a basis of classification sex is similar in many respects to race,
and reasons for giving both the same special scrutiny, see Bartlett, supra note 8, at
1557-60.
48400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971), vacating 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969). The Court in
Phillips indicated that the discrimination against the plaintiff mother was based on two
factors: "sex" phls "pre-school aged children." The coalescenc.e of these two elements
was the reason she was denied employment. A per se violation of Title VII was found,
and the case was remanded. The relevant classification was d.termined to be women
with pre-school age children and men with pre-school age childrer. The Court remanded,
however, for an evidentiary hearing on the company's justificadon for its policy, pre-
sumably to be presented under the BFOQ exception. The House had rejected an amend-
ment to Title VII which would have qualified the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit
only employer practices based solely on sex, race, national origin, or religion. 110 CONG.
Rc. 2728 (1964) (amendment offered by Rep. Dowdy). See Note, supra note 4, at 1172,
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down, under Title VII, a classification which discriminated against
women with pre-school age children but not against men with children
of the same age. In Aiello the same result would be warranted if the
classifications were viewed as women with female disabilities and men
with male disabilities." Had the Court interpreted the exclusion of
pregnancy benefits in this way, it could not have ignored Phillips.
Moreover, given the context of a disability program which extended
coverage to numerous disabilities unique to men, such a definition of the
classification is compelling. The Court's failure to accept this definition
represents a serious flaw in its opinion, a flaw that should vitiate the
use of Aiello as a precedent.
It can also be argued that the Supreme Court in Aiello returned to
an outdated standard of review by applying the "reasonableness" test
instead of applying the intermediate standard requiring a "fair and
substantial" relationship to the object of the legislation." The exclu-
sion of pregnancy from this state disability program might be said to
have had a fair and substantial relationship to the state fiscal purposes
in maintaining a self-supporting program. However, by excluding
pregnancy, the program's explicit purpose of mitigating "the evils and
burdens which fall on the unemployed and disabled worker and his
family" was not satisfied for women while it was for men. Moreover,
the program would fail to meet the LaFleur requirment that the regu-
lations not unduly infringe upon a person's constitutional rights.5" It
seems reasonable, as the district court observed, that the self-supporting
nature of the program in Aiello could have been achieved in less drastic,
sexually neutral ways. For example, reasonable changes could have been
made in the maximum benefits provided and in the contribution rates."
Although the Court's standard in Reed was stricter than that gen-
erally applied in cases involving commercial and economic matters,5
special judicial scrutiny would nevertheless be appropriate here owing to
the interest of procreation and its interaction with established constitu-
for the argument that a statistical analysis that 75 percent of those holding the jobs were
women is inconsistent with the purpose of civil rights legislation--"to protect the indi-
vidual from being treated differently because she is a member of a wider group, sex-
defined in this case, and not to protect simply a majority of that group to the exclusion
of the rest."
49 For a discussion of the "sex-plus" doctrine, see Bartlett, supra note 8, at 1155-56.
50 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
51 CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE: § 2601 (West 1972).
52 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647 (1974).
53 See, e.g., the recommendations of the district court in Hansen v. Aiello, 359 F.
Supp. 792, 798 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
54 E .g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970) ; Flemming v. Nestor, 363
U.S. 603, 611 (1960).
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tional rights of privacy.55 For example, prior to the Aiello case, the
Court struck down a state workmen's compensation provision which
relegated unacknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased to a
lesser status with respect to benefits than that occupied by the legiti-
mate children because the equal protection clause forbids laws based
on the status of birth." The biological reproductive capacity of a
woman, like the status of birth, it something over which the individual
has no control. Arguably, then, to deny a woman disability benefits
because of her biological status and her exercise of her right to procreate
should be a violation of the equal protection clause.' No woman should
be denied an opportunity to enjoy the benefits of this state disability
program or penalized for exercising her right to procreate. The major-
ity opinion in Aiello, in applying the "reasonableness" test, forced this
case into the same category as decisions involving discrimination affect-
ing commercial interests and thus ignored both the constitutional im-
portance of the interest at stake and the invidiousness of the classifica-
tions-factors that call for more than lenient scrutiny.
An even stricter standard of review, the "compelling state interest"
test, 8 could have been applied under the suspect classification rationale.
Since only women become pregnant, to exclude pregnancy from the
disability benefit program creates a classification based on sex. Such
sex-based classifications are arguably suspect."
A second way in which the compelling state interest test could have
been invoked would have been to find that the challenged regulation
impinged on a "fundamental" right, the right to procreate."0 If the
rr5E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) ; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) ;
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942). See Buckley v. Coyle Pub. School Sys., 476 F.2d 92, 96 (10th Cir. 1973)
(woman's privacy is invaded by requiring her to choose betwem employment and preg-
nancy, thus curtailing her interest in procreation).
1,8 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972).
67 Such an argument would follow the analysis suggested in the abortion decisions,
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
5a See note 17 supra & text accompanying.
59See the plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973)
(statutes which provided the wife of a male serviceman with dependents' benefits but not
the husband of a servicewoman unless she proved that she supplied more than one-half
of her husband's support violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment). Sev-
eral state and federal courts have followed the Fronfiero "saspecet" classification ap-
proach in invalidating sex-based classifications. E.g., Johnston v. Hodges, 372 F. Supp.
1015 (E.D. Ky. 1974) (state requirement that father with custody of minor child, but
not mother, sign driver's license application and assure responsibiity for minor while driv-
ing) ; Ballard v. Laird, 360 F. Supp. 643 (S.D. Cal. 1973) (service tenure differential) ;
Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) (exclusion
of women from employment as bartender); Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wash. 2d 195, 517 P.2d
599 (1973, 1974) (denial of unemployment benefits to pregnant women).
60E.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
1975]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
classification in Aiello were subjected to "strict scrutiny," it would
likely fare no better than have classifications in other cases where the
Court adopted this rigorous standard of review.8' Because of these
weaknesses in the Aiello analysis, attempts to read the decision broadly
should be resisted.
Guidelines Are Unconstitutional
Finally, it might be argued that the analysis in Aiello makes the
Guidelines unconstitutional as a form of reverse discrimination against
men. This argument is tenable only if one assumes that Aiello defines
what equal protection means-not that it merely delineates what equal
protection permits. Arguably, anything that goes beyond the dictates
of the equal protection clause, as Title VII Guidelines seemingly do in
protecting pregnant women, would be discrimination against men. The
language in the majority opinion contrasting the program's higher
annual claim cost and annual claim rate for women with the lesser
claim cost and rate for men reflects such a concern about preferential
treatment."s Similarly, the conclusion that risks protected for men are
the same as those protected for women also suggests the objective of
maintaining equality.6"
If Aiello is interpreted broadly, and is read as stating what equal
treatment in the area of pregnancy constitutionally requires, and if the
Guidelines are to require "more equal" treatment of women, an uncon-
stitutional discrimination against men results. This argument sub-
stantially undercuts that made earlier on the permissibility of exceeding
constitutional minimums."
Such an extreme interpretation of Aiello should be avoided in
favor of a narrow reading based upon the compelling policies support-
ing the Guidelines. First, the Guidelines explicitly state that employ-
ment policies shall be applied to pregnancy disabilities on the same terms
(not different terms) as applied to other disabilities.6" This is consistent
with the purpose of Title VII to provide equal employment opportunity
and conditions of employment by not penalizing women with a pregnancy
disability whereas those with other disabilities are not denied benefits.
Second, even assuming the Court's comparison of women's contribu-
tions to the program with those made by men is appropriate in the
61E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) ; Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-69 (1964) ; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942).
82417 U.S. at 497 n.21.
63 Id. at 496-97.
64 See text accompanying note 42 supra.
65 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1974).
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equal protection analysis, the fact that women rcceive lower salaries
than men " would account for their 1 percent contributions being 28
percent of the total disability insurance whereas they receive approxi-
mately 38 percent in benefits,6 and would suggest that women are there-
fore actually denied equal results for the same work efforts. Third,
males, being partners in the procreative process, would not have to share
medical expenses out of their own incomes or sh ,-re even part of the
burden of the loss of a woman's wages due to childbirth. The fact that
a man does not bear children does not mean that the man and other
members of the family should be denied benefits from the California
disability program. Finally, the California disabil ty program, despite
its stated purpose," operates, as did the statutes in Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld" and Frontiero v. Richardson,7 to deprive women of pro-
tection against income loss for their families which men receive for
their families when they are temporarily disabled. Like Stephen
Wiesenfeld, 71 the plaintiff in Aiello was denied the opportunity to
show that her family, as may have been the case, Nx as dependent on the
plaintiff for support. Thus, not only do women receive less pay than
men, but women are denied the same protection for their families as
a male worker would receive for his family and are deprived of part
of their earnings out of which benefits would be paid to men for such
temporary sex-specific disabilities as prostatectomies. 7 ' For these
reasons, Aiello must be interpreted at most to state what the equal
protection clause permits, not what it requires. This would allow the
EEOC Guidelines to surpass the protection given in Aiello, as argued
earlier.
60 In 1971, among fully employed workers, women's median income was only three-
fifths that of men. The earnings differential, taking into accotutt the differences in edu-
cation and work experience, is about 20 percent. WOMEN'S BLrmEAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LA-
BOR, WOMEN WORKERS TODAY 6 (1973).67417 U.S. at 497.
68 See note 51 supra & text accompanying.
0o95 S. Ct. 1225 (1975) (holding that benefits under the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 402(g) (1970), based on the earnings of a deceased husband and father are
payable to the widow and to the couple's minor children whereas the benefits based on
the earnings of a deceased wife are payable only to the minor children and not to the
widower is indistinguishable from the classification held invalid in Frontiero and there-
fore the challenged section violates the due process clause).
70411 U.S. 677 (1973).
7' Compare Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 95 S. Ct. 1225 (1975), with Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
72 Workers are compensated for almost every other disability, including costly dis-
abilities such as heart attacks, voluntary disabilities such as cosmetic surgery or steriliza-
tion, and sex and race unique disabilities such as prostatectomies. 417 U.S. at 499-500
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION
The minimal protection afforded by the fourteenth amendment
should not preclude the stricter mandate of Title VII to eliminate
vestiges of sex discrimination in the job market. Geduldig v. Aiello
should be read narrowly to state only what equal protection permits,
not what it requires, and should be confined to its facts to permit EEOC
regulation of the immediate employer-employee relationship. The weak-
nesses of the opinion and its potential policy implications militate against
a broad reading which might bring about the demise of the EEOC
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex. Until the Supreme Court
is willing to treat pregnancy as a sex classification and subject regula-
tions which affect pregnancy to the stricter scrutiny they deserve, the
Guidelines are the best available alternative to ensure equality of treat-
ment by employers to pregnant women.
RHODA BUNNELL
